Page 33 - 期货和衍生品行业监管动态（2024年6月刊）

期货和衍生品行业监管动态

Beginning on February 1, 2017, and continuing through the end of the month,

Trafigura bid heavily for and bought cargoes of fuel oil in the benchmark’s trading

window, in an amount much larger than it had ever previously purchased in the

window in a single month. Trafigura’s heavy bidding and buying activity in that short

period tended to increase prices paid in the window, and ultimately created artificially

high benchmark values, which benefited Trafigura’s long derivatives position. This

impact on the fuel oil benchmark was to the detriment of market participants who

looked to rely on the benchmark as a fair price reference.

Impeding Voluntary Communications with the CFTC

Finally, the order finds that between July 31, 2017 and 2020, Trafigura required

its employees to sign employment agreements, and requested that former employees

sign separation agreements, with broad non-disclosure provisions that prohibited the

sharing of Trafigura’s confidential information with third parties. These

non-disclosure provisions did not contain carve-out language expressly permitting

communications with law enforcement or regulators such as the CFTC. The

provisions caused confusion that resulted in an impediment to voluntary and direct

communications with the CFTC about possible violations of the CEA and CFTC

regulations in violation of the CEA’s prohibitions against impeding direct
communications with the CFTC.

The order finds that Trafigura’s conduct defrauded its counterparties, harmed

other market participants, and undermined the integrity of U.S. and global oil markets.

This case is brought in coordination with the DOE’s Corruption Task Force and

Insider Trading Task Force.

https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/8921-24

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